For three years after developing countries open their stock markets to inflows of foreign capital, the average annual growth rate of the real wage in the manufacturing sector increases by a factor of seven. No such increase occurs in a control group of developing countries that do not liberalize. The temporary increase in the growth rate of the real wage permanently drives up the level of average annual compensation for each worker in the sample by 856 US dollars-an increase equal to more than a quarter of their annual pre-liberalization salary. The increase in the growth rate of labor productivity in the aftermath of liberalization exceeds the increase in the growth rate of the real wage so that the increase in workers' incomes actually coincides with a rise in manufacturing sector profitability.
Introduction
In the late 1980s developing countries all over the world began easing restrictions on capital flows. A decade later many of the same nations experienced a string of financial crises, triggering a debate over the relative merits of capital account liberalization as a policy choice for developing countries. Critics claim that liberalization brings small benefits and large costs (Bhagwati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 1999) . Recent work documents evidence to the contrary. Liberalization in developing countries reduces their cost of capital (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry 2003; Stulz, 2005) , temporarily increases investment (Alfaro and Hammel, 2006 ), and permanently raises the level of GDP per capita (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2006; Henry, 2007) .
In the process of debating the costs and benefits of capital account liberalization, both critics and apologists have neglected the labor market. While it is important to understand how opening up affects prices and quantities of capital, almost two decades after the advent of capital account liberalization in the developing world, there is no systematic evidence on the behavior of wages in the aftermath of the policy change. This paper provides the first attempt to fill that gap. Figure 1 shows that in a sample of eighteen developing countries that opened their stock markets to inflows of foreign capital between 1986 and 1993, the average annual growth rate of the real wage in manufacturing jumped from 1.3 percent per year in non-liberalization periods to an average of 9.5 percent in the year liberalization occurred and each of the subsequent two years. The temporary 8.2 percentage-point increase in the growth rate of the real wage permanently drives up the level of average annual compensation for each worker in the sample of liberalizing countries by about 856 US dollars-an increase equal to more than a quarter of their annual pre-liberalization salary.
One concern about Figure 1 is that an exogenous productivity shock having nothing to do with opening may drive up real wages in liberalizing and non-liberalizing countries alike. To distinguish the impact of liberalization from that of a common shock, our estimation procedure compares the difference in wage growth before and after liberalization to the same difference for a control group of countries that are not undergoing liberalizations. In every specification, we find an economically and statistically significant increase in real wage growth for countries in the liberalization group and no effect no effect at all for the control group.
While our difference-in-difference approach enables us to test for effects of liberalization on real wages that have previously gone unexamined, difference-in-difference estimation requires caution because the standard errors are susceptible to serial correlation. For instance, of the ninety-two difference-in-difference papers published in top economics journals between 1990 and 2000, only five explicitly deal with serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainaithan, 2004 ). Peterson (2006) Liberalizing the stock market increases investment, which in turn drives up productivity and wages. Because it takes time for wages to adjust, wage growth for a given country may remain elevated above its steady-state rate for a number of years in the post-liberalization period, thereby inducing serial correlation in the country's wage-growth residuals over time. Similarly, liberalization often occurs at the same time across countries, thereby inducing correlation in the wage-growth residuals across countries at a given point in time. Our empirical analysis uses clustering techniques to adjust the standard errors for the occurrence of both forms of dependence in the residuals (we also adjust for heteroscedasticity). No matter what specification we use, or how we compute the standard errors, the impact of liberalization on real wage growth remains statistically significant for the treatment group and insignificant for the control group.
An additional concern is that with only eighteen countries in the sample, a few large outliers may drive the central finding. This is not the case. In the aftermath of liberalizations, a temporary increase in real wage growth occurs consistently across countries. In all but three of eighteen countries, the median growth rate of real wages in the post liberalization period exceeds the pre-liberalization median. Finally, the documented effects persist after controlling for movements in the exchange rate and the impact of economic reforms such as inflation stabilization, trade liberalization, and privatization programs.
Standard production theory provides the simplest explanation of the facts about liberalization and real wages documented in this paper. Liberalization reduces the cost of capital and firms respond by increasing their rate of investment. For a given growth rate of the labor force and total factor productivity, a higher investment rate increases the ratio of capital per effective worker, driving up the marginal product of labor, and in turn, the market-clearing wage.
Consistent with this interpretation, the growth rate of labor productivity also rises sharply in the aftermath of liberalizations. The average growth rate of labor productivity is 10.3 percentage points higher during the three-year liberalization window than in non-liberalization years.
Because the 10.3 percentage point increase in productivity growth outstrips the 8.2 percentagepoint increase in wage growth over the corresponding period, profitability in the manufacturing sector actually increases. In other words, the rise in workers' living standards does not reduce firm value.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 uses theory to generate testable predictions about liberalization and explains how we identify real-life liberalization episodes.
Section 3 describes the wage data and construction of the control group. Section 4 presents descriptive findings. Section 5 discusses the formal empirical methodology, results, and alternative interpretations. Section 6 concludes.
Capital Account Liberalization in Developing Countries
This section generates empirically testable predictions about the impact of capital account liberalization in a developing country on the time-path of the real wage (w). To maintain congruency with previous work we employ the well-trodden framework of the neoclassical growth model, but apply it in a way that delivers previously untested theoretical predictions.
The central point about capital account liberalization is that it moves developing countries from a steady state in which their ratios of capital to effective labor are lower (and rates of return to capital higher) than in the developed world, to a steady state in which capital-toeffective labor ratios and rates of return equal those in the developed world. Because capital and labor are complements in production, the marginal product of labor (and hence the real wage)
rises as countries open up and the process of capital deepening sets in.
2A. Theory
Assume that output is produced using capital, labor, and a Cobb-Douglas production function with labor-augmenting technological progress: 
Also assume that a constant fraction of national income is saved each period and added to the capital stock, capital depreciates at the rateδ , the labor force grows at the rate n, and total factor productivity grows at the rate g.
When the economy is in steady state is constant at the level k
and the marginal product of capital equals the interest rate (r) plus the depreciation rate:
Because the impact of liberalization works through the cost of capital, equation (3) has important implications for the dynamics of and w in the aftermath of opening up. k
Let r* denote the exogenously given world interest rate. The standard assumption in the literature is that r* is less than r, because the rest of the world has more capital per unit of effective labor than the developing country. It is also standard to assume that the developing country is small, so that nothing it does affects r*. Under these assumptions, capital surges in to exploit the difference between r* and r when the developing country liberalizes. ). In the post-liberalization steady state, the marginal product of capital equals the world interest rate plus the rate of depreciation:
Instantaneous convergence is an unattractive feature of the model, because it implies that the country installs capital at the speed of light. There are a variety of formal ways to slow down the speed of transition (see Appendix A). For now, the vital point to note is that k is greater than 0 during the country's transition to the post-liberalization steady-state.
The temporary growth in k has implications for the growth rate of the real wage. Since workers are paid their marginal product of labor,
The growth rate of the real wage is the derivative of the natural log of with respect to time: w
. For the case of Cobb Douglas technology this expression simplifies to:
Prior to liberalization the ratio of capital to effective labor remains at the constant level, , the growth rate of the real wage also increases temporarily. Figure 2 illustrates the hypothetical time paths of r and the natural log of k and w under the assumption that the interest rate converges immediately upon liberalization but the ratio of capital to effective labor does not. The hypothetical response of the real wage to liberalization bears close resemblance to the real-life response in Figure 1 . The next subsection explains how we identify the liberalization episodes used to construct Figure 1 and that we will ultimately use to systematically test the theory.
2B. Reality
Testing the prediction that real wage growth will rise immediately following the removal of restrictions on capital inflows requires information on capital account liberalization dates that is more precise than can generally be obtained. The capital account has many components, so trying to determine exactly when countries liberalize "the" capital account (as in the model), is one of the most difficult parts of trying to assess the economic impact of changes in capital account policy. The difficulty of determining exactly when countries liberalize causes most papers in the literature to ignore the problem (Eichengreen, 2001 (Henry, 2007) . For example, AREAER does not indicate whether the change in judgment about openness results from an easing of restrictions on capital inflows or outflows. The distinction matters. Theory predicts that when a capital-poor country liberalizes capital inflows it will experience a permanent fall in its cost of capital and a temporary increase in the growth rate of wages. In principle, if that same developing country were to liberalize capital outflows nothing would happen to its cost of capital, investment, or GDP.
In contrast to the previous literature, we address the complexity of identifying liberalization dates by narrowing the scope of the problem. Instead of trying to determine the date on which the entire capital account switches from closed to open, we identify the first point in time that a country liberalizes a specific component of the capital account. One example of liberalizing a specific component of the capital account is a decision by a country's government to permit foreigners to purchase shares of companies listed on the domestic stock market.
Liberalizing restrictions on the ownership of domestic shares enables foreign capital to flow into a part of the country's economy from which it was previously prohibited.
Just such a policy change occurred repeatedly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as a number of developing countries opened their stock markets to foreign investors for the first time.
Removing restrictions on the ownership of domestic shares enables foreign capital to flow into a part of the country's economy from which it was previously prohibited. Relative to the broadest conception of the capital account, the easing of restrictions on foreign investment in the stock market may seem like a parochial way to define capital account liberalization. But it is precisely the narrowness of stock market liberalizations that make them useful for testing the theory. As the previous paragraphs explain, changes in broad measures of capital account openness such as the AREAER provide a very noisy measure of liberalization policy. Since measurement error reduces the statistical power of any regression, it is important to focus on policy experiments where the true variation in the data is large relative to noise.
As the closest empirical analogue to the textbook example in Section 2A, stock market liberalizations provide just such experiments (Frankel, 1994) . Accordingly, in this paper we use the year in which countries first opened their stock markets to foreign investors as the empirical counterpart to year "0" in the model of Section 2. According to Standard and Poor's Emerging
Markets Database, there are 53 developing countries with stock markets. Of these fifty three, eighteen have stock market liberalization dates that are: (a) consistently used elsewhere in the literature and (b) verifiable from primary sources. Column (1) of Table 1 lists these eighteen countries and the year in which they liberalized. 1 Table 1 also presents summary statistics on the behavior of real wages in each of the eighteen liberalizing countries. The next section explains the source and construction of the wage data.
Data
The wage data come from the Industrial Statistics Database of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). UNIDO provides data on total wages and salaries, total employment and output for the manufacturing sector. For a given year, wages and salaries include all payments in cash or in kind paid to employees. Payments include: (a) direct wages and salaries; (b) remuneration for time not worked; (c) bonuses and gratuities; (d) housing allowances and family allowances paid directly by the employer; and (e) payments in kind.
Excluded from wages and salaries are employers' contributions on behalf of their employees to social security, pension and insurance schemes, as well as the benefits received by employees under these schemes and severance and termination pay.
Conceptually, total wages and salaries equal W*L*H, where W is the hourly wage rate, L is the stock of labor and H is total hours worked for the year. Since UNIDO provides no data on the number of hours worked or the hourly wage we divide total wages and salaries by total employment (L) to compute the average annual wage (W*H) in the manufacturing sector of each country. UNIDO reports the value of wages and salaries in US dollars, with the conversion from local currency made at the official nominal exchange rate. We deflate each country's nominal annual wage in US dollars by the US consumer price index (CPI ) to create a dollar-denominated real wage.
For each country in our sample, the annual wage data generally run from 1960 to 2003, with the exact dates differing by countries. After taking the difference of the natural log to compute growth rates, we have a total of 502 country-year observations with which to identify the impact of liberalization on real wage growth. Table 1 shows that the timing of liberalizations is correlated across countries, so these 502 observations are not entirely independent. For instance, liberalizations may coincide with an exogenous global productivity shock that drives up wages in all countries, irrespective of whether or not they liberalize. To address whether this is the case we select a control group of countries in the manner described below.
3A. Construction of the Control Group
An ideal control group would consist of developing countries that are identical to the liberalizing countries in every respect except that the control countries did not open their stock markets to foreign investment. In practice, many of the developing countries that have stock markets but never liberalized them are not appropriate control countries. The purpose of the control group is to determine whether the temporary increase in real wage growth in the liberalizing countries was driven by a global economic shock unrelated to opening up. It is therefore critical that the control group not consist of countries in such an abject state of development that real wages would not respond to an external shock, no matter how favorable.
As it turns out, the list of forty-eight countries (see Appendix B) that have stock markets but never liberalized includes many countries at a low level of economic infrastructure such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Malawi, Sierra Leone, and Togo. For those countries on the list of fortyeight that are at a similar stage of development as the liberalizers, their demarcation as nonliberalizers raises doubts about the reliability of the classification. For instance, Jamaica is classified as having never liberalized, but in 1987 one of the authors of this article purchased stock in Jamaica (as a newly naturalized US citizen).
In the absence of an ideal set of control countries, we use the liberalizing countries as their own control group in the following way. For a given liberalizing country, we define the control group as the subset of the eighteen countries in Table 1 Extending the control group restriction beyond two years would alleviate the problem of overlap, but for every given liberalizer, it would severely reduce the number of countries in the control group. In the end, we prefer to risk understating the significance of our results to using control groups that are not adequately large. Figure 1 suggests that a common global shock does not explain the inflection in the solid line, with only 2 We use the control groups to construct the dashed line in Figure 1 as follows. Fix a country and its corresponding liberalization date. For each element of the liberalizing country's control group, calculate the natural logarithm of the real wage for the years in the interval [-2, -1, 0, 1, 2] . This yields a set of control-group-real-wage paths for the fixed liberalization-country. Next, for each year in [-2, -1, 0, 1, 2] calculate the mean over the entire set of all control-group-real-wage paths. Calculating these means creates a single path of the real-wage growth for the control group associated with the given liberalizing country. After repeating this procedure for each of the other seventeen liberalizing countries, we have eighteen control-group-real-wage-growth paths, one for each liberalizing country. The dashed line in Figure 1 is the average of all eighteen of these paths.
Descriptive Findings
eighteen countries in the sample an important question is whether a few outliers drive the increase.
Turning from means to medians, the data in Table 1 demonstrate that this is not the case.
In the first year after liberalization (year [1]) five countries experience real wage growth that falls below the median growth rate of their real wage for the entire sample period. Under the null hypothesis that liberalization years are no different than non-liberalization years, the probability of finding no more five countries below their median growth rate is 0.06. Similarly, in year [2], only five countries experience below-median annual real wage growth. Taking years
[1] and [2] together, the probability of finding no more than ten episodes of below-median wage growth is 0.03.
Although the numbers in Table 1 suggest a consistent increase in real wage growth across countries, several other questions about the data remain.
First, the necessity of using annual instead of hourly wages raises a potential measurement concern. If the average number of annual hours worked per employee increases following liberalizations, then total annual compensation may rise without any change in the implied hourly wage. In other words, the rise in annual labor income (W*H) documented in Figure 1 could be the result of an increase in hours worked rather than an increase in the hourly wage rate. To interpret the impact of liberalization on total annual compensation as an increase in labor's compensation per unit of time, we need to know that the average number of hours worked does not rise significantly following liberalizations. Section 5C documents that we obtain similar results in a sub sample of countries for which we have data (from a source other than UNIDO) on hourly wages. Third, liberalizations often coincide with major economic reforms that could have a significant impact on wages outside of any impact of liberalization. Stabilizing inflation, removing trade restrictions, and privatizing state owned enterprises are all reforms that may affect real wages through their impact on the efficiency of domestic production. Indeed, Table 2 demonstrates that the timing of these reforms makes it plausible that they, not capital account liberalization, are responsible for the increase in real wages apparent in Figure 1 . The next section uses the information in Table 2 to control directly for the impact of other reforms and to address a host of other lingering concerns and alternative explanations.
Empirical Methodology and Results
We evaluate the statistical significance of the temporary increase in wage growth for the treatment group by estimating the following panel regression: 
The left-hand-side variable, , is the natural log of the real dollar value of annual compensation for country i in year t minus the same variable in year t-1. Moving to the righthand-side of equation (1), the constant measures average annual wage growth across all countries over the entire sample period. In principle, one might argue for the inclusion of country-specific fixed effects on the grounds that wage growth may vary across countries due to differences in total factor productivity growth. To investigate this possibility we estimated regressions of wage growth on a constant and seventeen country dummies. None of the country dummies were significant, so we use a single constant. is that it has low power. SUR also requires a balanced panel, and due to missing observations, creating a balanced panel would result in discarding a number of liberalization events. Given data limitations, the pooled cross-section time series framework is more appropriate.
The right-hand-side of equation (6) To compute standard errors that are correct, we construct clusters of residuals which allow for correlation within each cluster of observations. First, we cluster by year to produce standard errors that account for the possibility that shocks to wage growth are correlated across countries within a given year. Second, we cluster by country to produce standard errors that account for the possibility that the shocks to wage growth are correlated over time within a given country. We also report estimates that correct for heteroscedasticity. Table 3 is significant at the 1 percent level.
5A. Results
An exogenous shock to wages does not seem to drive the result because the coefficient on the dummy variable for the control group is never significant. The estimate of the coefficient on CONTROL ranges from -0.014 to -0.018 and fails to attain statistical significance in every
specification. An F-test confirms that the difference between the estimate of the coefficient on LIBERALIZE and CONTROL is statistically significant at the one percent level in every specification in Table 3 .
Controlling for the other economic reforms that tend to accompany liberalization also does not reduce the impact of capital account opening on the growth rate of the real wage.
Column (5) in Panel A of Table 3 shows that after accounting for the effects of inflation stabilization, trade liberalization, and privatization, the coefficient on LIBERALIZE is 0.082.
Because some of the economic reforms have a significant impact on the growth rate of the real wage, we are confident in the accuracy of the reform dates and the relevance of the corresponding dummy variables as controls. For instance, the coefficient on STABILIZE is -0.096 and significant at the one percent level. The negative impact of stabilization programs on real wage growth is consistent with some of the literature on the real effects of inflation stabilization in developing countries.
Finally, the significance of the estimates of the liberalization dummy presented in Panel A of Table 3 is also robust to the statistical concerns we mentioned earlier. presents estimates that adjust the standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity. Table 5 (Panel A) presents estimates that adjust for heteroscedasticity and cross-country correlation. Table 6 (Panel A) presents estimates that correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
None of these adjustments alter the results from Panel A of Table 3 
5A.1 The Impact of Liberalization on Productivity
The response of wages to capital account liberalization is large. To scrutinize the plausibility of our estimates we cross-checked the results against data on labor productivity. The model in Section 2 demonstrates that liberalization induces capital deepening, and through the increase in capital per worker, drives up productivity, the demand for labor, and the real wage. If this chain of reasoning has any empirical bite then during liberalization episodes labor productivity should rise in concert with wages. If productivity does not rise by the same order of magnitude as wages, then doubt arise about the mechanisms for which we argue and the credibility of our results. Figure 3 shows that the time path of the natural log of productivity in the aftermath of liberalization looks very similar to that of the real wage (Figure 1 ). To test formally the relation between liberalization and the growth rate of labor productivity, we estimate the following regression:
Equation (7) is identical to (6) except that instead of the change in the natural log of the annual wage, the left-hand-side variable is now the change in the natural log of annual output per worker.
Panel B of Table 3 shows that liberalization has a positive and significant impact on productivity growth. The estimates of the coefficient on the liberalization dummy range from 0.055 to 0.104. Every estimate of the coefficient on the liberalization dummy in Panel B of Table 3 is significant at the one percent level. In contrast, the estimate of the coefficient on the control dummy is never significant. Taken together, these results suggest that liberalization, not an external shock or domestic economic reforms, are responsible the increase in productivity growth.
In particular, Column (5) of Panel B in Table 3 demonstrates that after accounting for the potential impact of other economic reforms, the estimate of the coefficient on the liberalization dummy is 0.104. This means that the average growth rate of productivity is 10.4 percentage points higher during the three-year liberalization window than in non-liberalization years. The 10.4 percentage point increase in productivity growth associated with liberalization is larger than the 8.2 percent increase in wage growth. Hence the increase in productivity more than compensates for the increase in wage growth and profitability in the manufacturing sector actually rises, a fact consistent with the post-liberalization rise in the rate of return to capital documented in Chari and Henry (2007) .
5B. Discussion
The growth rate of labor productivity rises by roughly 10 percentage points following liberalization. A few simple calculations reveal that this increase is too large to be explained solely by the increase in the rate of capital accumulation. Equation (5) shows that the growth rate of wages equals the growth rate of total factor productivity plus alpha times the growth rate of capital per worker. This means that the increase in the growth rate of wages and productivity following liberalization is equal to the increase in productivity plus alpha times the increase in capital per worker.
For realistic values of alpha, the increase in productivity is too large to be accounted for by the increase in the growth rate of capital per worker. If alpha equals one-third, the growth rate of capital per worker would have to increase by a more than 24 percentage points to account for the increase in productivity and wages. Our data set does not provide information on the size of the capital stock in the manufacturing sector, but a little reflection suggests that a twenty-fourpercentage-point increase in the growth rate of capital per worker is not plausible.
The growth rate of the aggregate capital stock of liberalizing countries increases by a little more than one percentage point following liberalizations (Henry, 2003) . The manufacturing sector in these economies accounts for roughly twenty percent of GDP.
Assuming zero net growth in capital in agriculture and manufacturing, the largest possible increase in the growth rate of capital in manufacturing is about five percentage points. This back-of-the-envelope calculation finds empirical support elsewhere in the literature. Using a subset of the countries in this paper, Chari and Henry (2007) calculate that the growth rate of capital in the manufacturing sector increases by about four percentage points per year following liberalizations. Multiplying four by a number between one-third and one-half generates productivity and wage growth of no larger than two percentage points, so it is clear that capital accumulation alone cannot account for the increase in productivity and wages.
Any increase in the growth rate of labor productivity unaccounted for by capital deepening must be the consequence of an increase in the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP). Because the standard neoclassical model does not provide any channel through which capital account liberalization affects the growth rate of TFP, the question is what drives the increase. Some argue that the simplest explanation lies with the economic reforms that accompany liberalization (Henry, 2003) . Economic reforms improve resource allocation, essentially producing a one-time shift in the production function that temporarily raises the growth rate of TFP. Others posit that liberalization brings new managerial and technological know-how that improves the efficiency of the domestic financial system (Mishkin, 2006) . Yet another explanation is that capital account liberalization generates unspecified "collateral benefits" that increase productivity (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2006) .
Sorting through competing explanations for the increase in total factor productivity following liberalizations is an important research challenge that lies beyond the scope of this paper. Whatever the principal driving factor may be, the increase in the growth rate of TFP documented here confirms (using different data) a finding that crops up consistently across studies of liberalization and the real economy.
5C. Alternative Explanations/Robustness Checks
We have argued that wages rise following liberalizations because of an increase in labor demand stemming from a capital-deepening induced rise in productivity. Alternatively, the increase in wages may be due as much to a reduction in labor supply as an increase in labor demand. The argument runs as follows. If the impact of liberalization on wages is perceived to be permanent, then it is as if labor market participants received a positive shock to their permanent income. Labor supply decisions may respond accordingly. Specifically, labor supply might decrease in response to the positive shock to permanent income. 3 If labor supply decreases in response to higher expected future income, then it may be the case that the observed rise in wages results from a decrease in labor supply as well as an increase in labor demand.
The data on employment are not consistent with a decrease in labor supply. Using equation (6), we replace the change in the natural log of the real wage with the change in the natural log of the stock of employment. There is no significant change in the growth rate of employment following liberalizations.
We also looked at data on hours worked. If labor supply decreases then the number of hours worked should fall. In our attempt to see whether this is the case we had to rely on data for a smaller set of countries. UNIDO does not provide data on hours worked. The International
Labor Organization (ILO) data was also not helpful; the ILO's definition of hours worked is inconsistent across countries and sometimes varies across sectors within a given country. In the end we managed to get consistently constructed data on hours worked from the Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC) for the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Turkey, Taiwan, and Venezuela. Again, we replicated regression (6), this time using the change in the natural log of hours worked as the left-hand-side variable. The results
show that there is no significant change in the number of hours worked
The absence of a significant change in the number of hours worked also suggests that the increase in the annual real wage reported in Section 5A is not the result of an increase in hours worked, but indeed an increase in the rate of compensation per unit of time. As a final check we also used the GGDC data to construct a measure of hourly wages for the subset of countries mentioned above. Again, we replicated equation (6), changing the left-hand-side variable to the change in the natural log of the hourly wage. The results are qualitatively identical to those reported in Tables 3 through 6 .
Overall, we find no obvious evidence signifying that labor supply changes in response to liberalization. While we cannot definitively exclude the possibility that part of the wage increase results from a decrease in labor supply, the alternative explanation does not seem tenable in face of the evidence. Regardless of the stand you take on the labor supply decision in developing countries, the data are consistent with the prediction that capital account liberalization drives up wages as predicted by standard models of production in which labor and capital are complements-even if we can't say how much of the increase in wages is due to a change in labor supply versus a change in labor demand
Conclusion
Opening up the stock market to foreign investment induced significant capital deepening in the manufacturing sector of liberalizing countries, driving up the productivity and real wage of manufacturing labor. This does not necessarily mean that aggregate welfare improves, because we do not have data to assess the impact of capital account liberalization on wages in other sectors of the economy. Integration into the world economy during the 1980s and 1990s increased the ratio of skilled-to-unskilled wages in developing countries (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007) . We cannot rule out the possibility that easing restrictions on capital inflows contributed to the widening of the gap.
Be that as it may, the results in this paper demonstrate that trade in capital has significant implications for the real economy beyond its impact on asset prices and investment. All else equal, capital account liberalization raises the average standard of living for a significant fraction of the workforce in developing countries without eroding shareholders' profitability. One can think of worse outcomes. 
